



Debt  and International  Finaulce
Intemational  Economics  Department




of Debt and Debt Service
Reduction
Eduardo Fernandez-Arias
Contrary o popular views, commercial  banks have probably
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Fernandez-Arias evaluates the costs and benefits  The impact of DDSR on development Is
of debt and debt service reduction (DDSR) from  usually measured by the increase In the growth
the point of view of five countries that have  rate of GDP, but it is too soon to measure that for
concluded Brady deals: Costa Rica, Mexico, the  these five countries. A suitable alternative is to
Philippines, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  look at the change in investment patterns.
He concludes that, contrary to widely held  A strong policy framework is needed if debt
views, commercial banks have probably ben-  and debt service reduction are to significantly
efited from the operations. Commercial bank  improve development. In Mexico and, to a lesser
participation in DDSR is voluntary, so direct  extent, Venezuela improved and sustained strong
financial savings to the country are probably  adjustment policies have generated the greatest
negative at p  esent values. The benefit from  development benefits. Gains have been less in
DDSR is not that debt is bought at "bargain  smaller countries where policies were not as
prices" at the expense of commercial banks. It  supportive.
appears difficuit to justify a DDSR operatior, on
purely financial grounds. A more realistic way to  Femandez-Arias concludes that for a country
look at a DDSR operation is to view it as a  to benefit from DDSR, it needs significant
"project" that involves a certain financial cost.  indirect benefits (such as increased domestic and
The  returm on such a project is how the DDSR  foreign savings). Direct benefits are likely to be
operation improves the macroeconomy, or  negative because of the commercial banks'
contributes to development.  financial gains and because DDSR operations are
frontloaded. DDSR operations cannot be justi-
The main purpose of DDSR is to establish a  fled solely by direct beneflts and savings in cash
,nore efficient arrangement between debtor  flow.
countries and commercial banks, leading to
improved conditions for development. A DDSR
operation that does not help development is
costly and should not be undertaken.
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References  38The theory  and  practice  of debt and  debt  service  reduction  (DDSR)  cost/benefit  evaluation  is a
matter  of controversy.  In this paper  we present  relevant  theoretical  and empirical  conttributions  within
an organizing  analytical  framework  in an attempt  to shed light on the bottom  lins: whether  DDSR
operations  are a good  idea  or not. For this  purpose,  the empirical  analysis  is mostly  based  on the five
Brady  deals  so far (Mexico,  Costa  Rica,  the PhiPlppines,  Venczuela,  and  Uruguay). 1
We define  DDSR  benefits  (or costs}  as the valuation  of the DDSR  from the point of view ot
the countr.  We start with the basic  premi&se  that to evaluate  a DDSR  operation  it is necessary  to
compare  scenarios  with and without  the operation.  We define  DDSR effects  as the changes  in the
Edo=  variables.  Once  this estimation  is done  a valuation  procedure  is used to  summarize  the value
of the operation.  It should  be noted  that we are mostly  concerned  with evaluating  the net benefits  of the
operation  accruing  to the country. A point stressed in the paper is that, from the viewpoint  of
supporting  official institutions,  significant  DDSR benefits relative to the statusquo situation is a
necessary  but not a sufficient  condition  to justify  an officially  s;pported  DDSR  operation. In fact, a
DDSR  operation  yielding  large  net benefits  under  these  conditions  would  not be a good  ge  of official
money  if the benefits associated  with the same,  level of official  financing  attached  to  he -DDSR
operation  are even  larger in the absence  of debt  reduction. In this context,  for a DD-CR  operation  to
have merits  it is necessary  that  it yield  positive  benefits  relative  to a situation  where  the same  level  of
official  support  is available. In other  words,  a DDSR  operation  entailing  official  supporting  financing
needs  to be compared  with  an alternative  scenario  where  the same  support  is provided. 2
lAt the  time  of writing,  Nigeria,  and  more  recently  Argentina  have  concluded  DDSR  operations.
2Strictly speaking,  to the extent that risk considerations  are relevant for official creditors and  the DDSR opemtion
changes the risk asssment,  for the -ame ris_k-atoj  support lending.  Whether the operation increases or
derease  ris  to official creditors is not clesr, beaus  while the risk on the stock of debt diminishes  due to the
improvement in the country's creditworthiness,  the supporting finacing,  particulrly  the additional portion,
enails new risks due to increased  exposre.  In any event, this issue is not addressed in this paper, and unless
otherwise  indicated  it will be asumed that  official lending  is riskless.2
This not  is organized  as follows. Section I set8 up a  basic analytical  framework  and
decomposes  the evaluation  problem  in three basic  components.  Sections  II to IV take up each one of
these  components:  Scenarios  and financial  savings,  Direct  benefits,  and Indirect  benefits. Section  V
presents  conclusions  by putting  together  the direct  and indirect  benefits. Annex  I presents  information
on some  key  statistics  of the five Brady  deals.
I.  MAIN COMPONENTS  OF THE EVALUATION
A basic  analytical  framework  can be set up by decomposing  the evaluation  problem  in three
main comnonents,  to which  we now turn.  This section  gives a preview  of the next three sections,
which  tate up each  one of the  three components  in more  detail.
I)  Scenarios  and Finandal Savings
The fbundation  of the emire building  is an adequate  description  of the economic  relations
between  the debtor country  and its commercial  bank creditors  both with and without the DDSR
operation.  On the one hand,  the operation  usually  entails  an up-front  cost C that the country  needs  to
spend in order to obtain  debt reduction  in exchange. On the other hand, the subsequent  carhflow
savings  with commercial  banks  implied  by the restructuring  operation  (St in period  t, where  t= 1,2,...)
need  to be estimated.  A summary  of the overall  cashflow  savings  can be obtained  by estimating  the
expected  net present  value  of cashflow  savings  R 'discounting  with  the risk-free  interest  rate).
To achieve  this, net transfers to commercial  banks in the counterfactual  scenario (Tt for
t=1,2,..4),  without DDSR, need to be estimated.  The assumptions  ;ade  for this counterfactual
scenario  are cridcal,  as we later discuss.  Similarly,  the cost of debt reduction  (C) and net transfers  to
commercial  banks in the scenario  with DDSR (Tt' for t= 1,2,...) need to be estimated.  Then the
cashflow  savings subsequent  to  the operation are  St=TTrTt', which may be  subject to  some
probabilistic  distribution  over a number  of contingencies.  The expected  present value o;  cashflow
savings  S is taken over these  contingencies  and expectations  about  discount  rates: S = EPV(St) - C.3
Disregarding  gains or losses that commercial  banks may make with parties other than the debtor
country  as a result  of the operation  (i.e. taxpayers  in creditor  countries),  S is also our estimate  of the
commercia'  banos' financial  loss.  We define  St a  the DDSR  direct financial  savinlg  in period  t
(where  S=  -C by definition)  and  S as the lDSR&  (total)  direct  financial  saving.
ii)  Direct Benefits
We define  DDSR  direct  effects  as the ones  associated  with  the liguidity  effects  of DDSR  direct
financiaLsffid.  Direct  financial  savin 6s would  affect  consumption  and investment  through  changes  in
liquidity,  leaving aside effects  stemming  from the incentive  structure  and other dimensions  to be
discussed  later. These  liquidity-induced  changes  in consumption  and investment  are the DDSR  direct
effects. Correspondingly.  we deine DDSR  direct  benefits  as the welfare  benefits  associated  with the
DDSR  direct effects.  Since in a credit-constrained  country  discount  rates on streams  of external
transfers  are higher  than  world  risk-free  discount  rates,  the time profile  of direct  financial  savings,  not
only  their  present  value  S, is important  for the direct  benefits.
111)  Indirect Benefits
By exclusion,  we define  DDSR  indirect  effects  as all the DDSR  effects  which  are not direct,
that is those  effects  beyond  the liquidity  effects  associated  with the financial  savings  with commercial:
banks.  and  ODSR  indirect  benefits  as the welfare  benefits  associated  with  them. Indirect  effects  spring
from  domestic  and  extWnal  sources:
*  120mesic  sr.lhere  may  be additional  incentives  for investing  domestically  which  would
stimulate  domestic  savings  and  favor  a better  policy  framework.  They  essentially  spring  from a
reduction  of the debt  overhang,  low  ceilings  on debt  service,  and, possibly,  improved
conditionality  attached  to official  support.4
*  EU  al sour.  There may be also induced changes  in the international  net transfer of
resources  beyond those accounted  for the direct financial  savings whose effects need to
be taken into account. They may incluce  additional  external financing  from official
sources, foreign direct investment,  capita' .iight reprtiation,  and also private credit if some
creditworthiness  is regained. These sources may be stimulated  by improved country
creditworthiness  and the efficiency  features of the new arrfakgement.  However, to the extent
that there are free-riders  (such as non-participating  private creditors) who make capital gains as
a result of the operation and improve  their ability  to extract  resources, there may be also a
negative  impact  on external  sources of finance. 3
I.  SCENARIOS AND FINANCIAL SAVINGS
Realistic scenarios  for net transfers to com'ercia! banks are needed to estimate  direct financial
savings.  We first estimate the savings in the short and medium run and then estimate savings in
present value terms.  Since present value calculations  take into account savings over the entire future,
they can be regarded as long-run estimations  in an average sense.
The cash flows associated  with the operations comprise  the up-front cost C and the subsequent
direct financial  savings St.  The cashflow  cost C results from cash buybacks and expenses  for collateral
purchases (an outflow) and new money from commercial  banks (an inflow). The cashflow implications
of collaterals  are as follows. The so-called  principal collateral  is actually equivalent  to a prepayment  of
principal. The only difference is that commercial  banks cannot freely dispose of that money for a
period of time, but interest payments  accrue to them. The interest collateral is a rolling-over  guarantee.
To the extent that interest service is made and the guarantee is not called, it is kept as part of the
country's reserves and would accrue interest to the country (which must be taken as an inflow in the
31n  this  paper  we  do not explore  the  possibility  of capital  gains  made  by extemal  claimants  other  than  commercial
banks. Simulations  on this issue can be found in Claeens,  Diwan and Femandez-Arias  (1992).  For a
justification  of  DDSR support based on  capital gains of  official creditors due  to  improved country
creditworthiness  see Diwan and Rodrik (1991).subsequent  years). However,  reserves  in the form of interest collateral  are absolutely  illiquid and
would  not contribute  to the desired  import  cover  of imn  taationz'  reserves,  which  implies  that from a
cashflow  point  of view it entails  an outflow.
Regarding  subsequent  savings,  in the short  and medium  run it can be reasonably  assumed  that
the new  reduced  commercial  debt  obligations  which  emerged  from  these  operations  are fully  serviced. 4
In relation  to the counterfactual  scenario,  how  net transfers  would  be negotiated  and determined  is in
the realm  of bargaining  theory  and  exceeds  the scope  of this note. 5 Two  assumptions  sometimes  made
include scheduled  payments,  that is full contractual  compliance,  and full interest paymonts  with
rescheduling,  where  principal  is rolled over at market  rates.  Additionally,  a plausible  medium-run
counterfactual  is one  where  the count-y's  annual  net transfer  amou;nts  to the annual  average  observed  in
recent  years  before  the operation.
The following  table refers  to financial  savings  on commercial  bank debt during the first four
calendar  years succeeding  the operation  (1991-1994  for Mexico, Costa Rica, the Philippines,  and
Venezuela,  and 1992-1995  for Uruguay). It shows  the up-front  cost C and the annual  service  of the
obligations  after  the operations  along  the lines  explained  above. It also  shows  the estimated  annual  net
transfers  and  financial  savings  under  the three  alternative  counterfactuals  described  above. They  are: i)
scheduled  debt  service,  where  net transfers  equal  tl'e contractual  obligations;  ii) interest  service,  where
interest  service  is paid and principal  is rolled over; and iii) historic, where net transfers  equal the
average  net transfers over the four calendar years prior to  the operations.  For  the historic
counterfactual,  subsequent  financial  savings  are also presented  as a percentage  of exports  in the year
before  the operation.
4This disregards the establishment  of debt-equity  swap facilities in connection to the DDSR operation, which
opens the possibility  of further debt reduction. These provisions  are not taken into account for the determination
of the debt reduction achieved through the DDSR agreements under review because commercial banks are
generaly not obliged to use them.  To the extent that banks have the option of not using them, swaps would
materialize  when they are profitable  as a separate transaction. Nevertheless,  the option value that these facilities
entail for bankB  would be immediately  incorporated  in secondazy  market  prices.
'See for example  the bargaining  model  in Fernandez-Arias  (1991).6
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We would  argue  that the historic  counterfactual  is generally  more  realistic  than the two other
counterfactuals.  In particular,  the assumption  of full debt  service  yields  short-run  financial  savings  that
are probably  too optimistic  for these  countries,  which  have  rescheduled  debt  in recent years  (and run
arrears in the case of Costa Rica).  Subsequent  financial  savings, as measured  by the hiscorical
counterfactual,  are relatively  small  compared  to exports.
With  the exception  of the Philippines,  where  new  money  more  than  financed  the buy-back  and
the up-front  cost C is conaequently  negative,  subsequent  financial  savings appear relatively  small
compared  to the cost  C.  This  observed  pattern  is to be expected  on theoretical  grounds. In the context
of  debt negotiations  commercial  banks attempt to  extract large net  transfers in  rescheduling
negotiations  and would  only consider  agreements  entailing  new money  as a partial offset of debt
service due.  The reason why they are not willing to  voluntarily  provide new money, even at
seemingly  convenient  terms, is that the debtor  cannot  commit  to repay it in the future. An operation7
where, in contrnst to actual operations, financial savings are positive in the short-run (and pcssibly
negative  in present value) would be equivalent  to such a transaction, which appeared to be infeasible  in
rescheduJing  negotiations.  Unless the DDSR operation enibles the debtor to improve its ability to
commit 6, negative  financial savings ini  the short and possibly mnedium  run should be expected.  The
evidence generally confirms th;s  theoretical presumption: Brady  deals  are  front-loaded,  with
commercial baks  receiving an Immediate compensation  ih  terms of  cash and enhancements whi.h
make them very costly in cashflow  terms from the debtor's point of view.
One of the roles of supporting  official creditors is precisely to alleviate  this front-loading. The
additional  lending and acceleration  of set-asides  from official sources provide cashflow relief and may
lead to an overall short-run positive cashflow impact from the country's viewpoint. 7 The benericial
effect of official financing will be analyzed  in the section IV (Indirect Benefits).  * It should be noted at
this point, however, that the positive short and medium-run  cashflow effec s of official support should
not be portrayed as benefits from the DDSR operation itself.  Me official financing provided for
DDSR would also have a positive cashfilow  effect if the country received the supporting financing
without conducting any DDSR operation.  In particular, under the assumption  that counterfactual  net
transfers to commercial  banks would not be affected  by the official support financing (which holds true
by definition if the assumption of full service or  fill  interest service is made), the same positive
cashflow effects of official financing can be obtained irrespective of whether a DDSR operation is
undertaken.  This observation is particularly relevant to  official supporting institutions, for which
financial  support is a policy decision.
In the long run, while the precise net transfers time profile is subject to many uncertainties, in
an average sense they can be characterized  by S, the expected  present value of direct financial savings.
60ne example  may be the  establishment  of debt  equity  facilities  at terms  convenient  to commercial  ban  from
which  the  debtor may find  difficult to renee once they become  part of officially supported  operations.
7Set-asides  provide  only tempomry  relief, since their acceleration  does not exceed  one or two yeas.  Additional
financig provide longer relief, but eventually  it is repaid and  also generates  compensating  outflows.  Since we
assume  that  official lending  is riskless,  cashflow  relief in present  value would be null (the grant component of
hese  loans  is negligible).8
A realistic estimation  of S would not yield a significant  saving, since in theory S can be expected  to be
negative.  The reason is that we should not expect banks to participate in the operation, which is
voluntary in nature, unless they expect to make a gain compared  to staying out8. To the extent that Wll
the payoffs connected  to the operation that banks receive are included in S, this amount would be our
estimate of  the  commercial banks loss.  To  the  extent that  they  do  not  have any  significant
informational  disadvantage,  it it not reasonable to assume that S is positive.  We point out that the
assumotion  that S summarizes  all the operation-related  payoffs  to banks is crucial.  It implies that third
pmrties  such as creditor country governments  and other relevant third parties stay along the sidelines,
as opposed to having a stick/carrot policy vis a vis commercial  banks in matters of regulation, etc.
Otherwise S is not sufficient: if third parties help banks if they reach an agreement, then banks may
make an overall gain even if S is positive; if third parties hurt the banks if they don't  reach an
agreement,  then banks may be willing to take a positive S in order to avoid the penalties.
Contractual financial savings, to the extent that debt is reduced at a discount, would yield, of
course, a positive present value saving S by definition. They probably overestimate,  however, a more
realistic estimation  of financial savings in present value based on more realistic scenarios.  Scenarios
where contractual  debt service is complied  with appear unrealistic. The historic record of overindebted
countries show that, in the absence of a DDSR operation, debt service obligations can be expected  to
be  eventually rescheduled, either formally through rescheduling agreements or  informally through
arrears.
The scenario with the DDSR operation is subject to similar considerations.  For debt which has
not been converted there is no strong reason for expecting  major changes. For debt which is converted
into the so-call.d Brady bonds the case can be mai  a  that the nature of the relation, and therefore
compliance, can be  expected to  change. The  key argument is that  bonds are  more difficult to
reschedule, which would expose the country to the full extent of default penalties in the case of non-
8Notice that this conclusion  is an implication  of the voluntary nature  of commercial  bank participation  and does
not rely on seconday muket valuations  being unbiased  estimators  of fture repayments. Quantitative  estimations
following  this second  approach  are  reported  in Claessens,  Diwan and Fernandez-Arias  (1992).9
compliance.  This in turn would induce  the country  to comply.  We would argue that, historically,
institutions  have always emerged  to facilitate  partial defaults on bonds.  Even if they failed to
materialize,  it is wt clear  whether  bonds  would  lead  to better  average  compliance.  While  the frequency
of non-compliance  may  be reduced  compared  to the syndicated  loan case, the payments  under those
circumstances  could  be zero instead  of a negotiated  positive  payment. As a practical  matter,  Brady
bonds  appear  to carry  substantial  pure country  risk discounts,  which  implies  that full compliance  may
be assumed  only in the next few years  and that it is not clear that transfers  under the scenario  with
DDSR  are significantly  less  uncertain  in the long  run.
How negative  S can be expected  to be depends  on the negotiation  framework  (see Claessens,
Diwan and Fernandez-Arias  (1992)  for a  complete  analysis).  Non-concerted  operations,  like for
example  Bolivia in  1988, have attracted  criticism  because of the fundamental  problem that each
individual  creditor  would  agree  to reduce  debt  only if the price is not  below  the fraction  of tlI  debt  it
expects  to recover  if it holds to its claims  and does not sell, which  is the so-called  average  cost and
conceptually  correspond  to the debt  secondary  market  price. However,  from the debtor  point  of view,
the corresponding  value of a one-dollar  reduction,  which we will call marginal  gain, is generally
smaller  because  of the decreasing  probability  of repaying  additional  units  of debt.  The problem  is made
worse  because  the relevant  average  opportunity  cost creditors  would  individually  consider  in a non-
concerted  operation  is the ex-post  market  prize, which  would  be pushed  up by the reduction  in debt.
Banks  have  an incentive  to free-ride  on selling  banks  and would  only sell at high prices, which  would
lead  to a significantly  negative  S.9
Concerted  operations  solve the free-rider  problem  by making  banks to share and therefore
internalize  the marginal  opportunity  cost of reducing  debt. In the case of  concerted  operations,
abstracting  from  the internal  sharing  arrangements  among  the  banks  and  the heterogeneity  among  them,
they can be treated  as a single  agent as a first approximation.  Then the opportunity  cost for them is
91t has been shown that non-concerted  debt  reduction  operations  are  so  costly  financially that net  benefits to
countries  can be expected to be negative even in the presence of large indirect effects (see Bulow  and  Rogoff
(1991)). See also Claessens  et. al. (1991).10
only  the decline  in the expected  present  discounted  value  of net transfers  associated  with  the lower  face
value,  that is the financ.al  gain  to the country. This opens  the possibility  of banks  being  pushed  close
to their collective  stagus  quo position, that is S=0  under the assumptions  spelled  out above. One
particular  way  to achieve  concertedness  is to present  a menu  of options  where  banks  not participating
in debt  reduction  have  to provide  new  money  (see Diwan  and Kletzer  (1991)).  While  this design  may
be good  for discriminating  among  heterogeneous  banks  (see  Diwan  and Spiegel  (1990)),  other non-of-
the-above  options  would  also serve the purpose  of concertedness  as long as all eligible banks are
obliged  to participate  for the  deal  to go through.
In order  to obtain  an estimate  of S, the expected  present  value  of net transfers  associated  with
commercial  bank obligations  can be assumed  to be similar  to the secondary  market  value of debt, and
therefore,  as a proportion  of the face  value  of debt  outstanding,  it can be assumed  to be similar  to the
secondary  market  price of debt.  It should  be noted that in the case of the counterfactual  scenario,
however,  the applicable  secondary  market  price is not the one  prevailing  at the time the operation  was
conducted  because  markets  anticipate  the financial  impact  of the operation  itself. This contamination
makes  the counterfactual  market  price unobservable  and leads to the need of estimating  it.  Prices
quoted  before  the Brady  announcement  on commercial  bank debt  reduction  (March 10, 1989)  are not
contaminated.  Adjustments  reflecting  changes  in the debt stock, interest rates, and factors  affecting
country creditworthiness  between  the date of that announcement  and the date the operation  was
concluded  should  be made. These adjustments  are significant  only in the ca&,e  of Venezuela,  which
benefitted  from  positive  developments  in the period. For the sake  of simplicity,  these  adjustments  are
disregarded  here.
Table  2 shows  estimates  of S based  on market  prices, obtained  as the difference  between  the
value of the new and the old portfolio  of assets that eligible  banks hold.  The value of the now
portfolio  is computed  in Claessens,  Diwan  and Fernandez-Arias  (1992)  as the value of the net cash
received  by banks (cash  minus  the expected  value  of new money)  plus the market  value of the debt
instruments  outstanding. In order to match  our analysis  in table 1, principal  and interest collateral11
were added to the net cash received  by banks (arriving at the cost C) and subtracted from the value of
outstanding  debt (arriving at the value of debt stripped  from the portion which was collateralized,  that
is risky debt).10 The value of the old portfolio was computed as the applicable market price times
eligible debt. The estimates  indicate  that banks have not made a loss in any of the Brady operations; in
the aggregate,  for the five countries considered,  S amounts  to minus $8. 1 bn.  11 It should be noted that
only very significant  upward adjustments  to the pre-Brady  prices of old debt would be needed in order
to revert this conclusion qualitatively;  on average, prices would need to be adjusted by more than a
third in order to obtain a positive S.
Table 2: Present Value of Cashflow Savings.i0
(US$  millons)
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Dn  the c  of the  principal  collaterl this is fully  justified  because  it amounts  to an implicit  prepayment  of debt
whose  present  value  is equal  to the face  value  of the coLral  (neglecting  the risk of the foreign  bonds  used  as
instruments). The case of the interest collateral  is different because it might not be used fully; its prepayment
value is model-dependent  (see Clark  (1990)  for a discussion  of the issues). In this point, mainly for ease of
exposition,  this paper departs from Claessens,  Diwan and Fenandez-Arias  (1992), where the prepayment
equivalent  of the  interest  collateral  is taken  as a fraction  of its face  value.
1  lThe difference  between  these  estimations  of S and  those  found  in Claessens,  Diwan  and Fernandez-Arias  (1992)
is explained  by differences  in the market  value of the old portfolio resulting  from the use of marginally  different
counterfactual  secondary  mafket  prices.12
These numerical calculations assume that the secondary market price reflects the fraction of
face value debt which can be expected  to be repaid in terms of present discounted value of future net
transfers.  Although  the issue is still open, most of the theoretical  arguments (for example  those based
on the insurance  guarantee  value of risky loans or speculative  bubbles) actually  point to the price being
too high, if anything. Counterarguments  based on bankers not being fully informed or rational beg the
question  of why would we expect government  officials, or ourselves as analysts for that matter, to do
any better and be in a position to second-guess  the market and outsmart the traders. It should be noted
also that even if there are significantly misinformed  traders in the market. the existence of a  few
informed  traders would ensure that the price is not below fundamentals.
Even granting that market prices may be too low, it is interesting  to see how much higher the
Wright"  prices would have to  be to justify the operation in  terms of  S. In  Annex 1 we compute
contractual financial savings, that  is  financial savings S  under  the  assumption that  contractual
obligations both before and after the deal will be honored in present value.12  In this extreme case
where it is assumed that the "right'  price should be essentially one, that is to say that no discount
should apply  to the price of debt, we obviously  obtain S  > 0 because  debt is reduced at a deep discount.
If we are willing to relax the assumption  that no market discount should apply, we can ask how large
the market price downward  bias has to be in order to obtain S = 0.
If the assumption  is made that restructured obligations  after the deal in the form of exit bonds
(or buybacks) and new money  bonds will be honored and that the payments associated with the rest of
the debt obligations will be the same both before and after the deal, then all savings are made on
restructured debt.  Then the pre-deal implicit discount  on del-t prices necessary to obtain a break-even
situation can be easily computed by dividing the contractual financial savings by the face value of
restructured debt (shown in Annex 1). In table 3 below it is shown that on average, all countries
12Strictly speaking,  contractual  financial  savings  would  be equal to S under this assumption  only if  the
contractual  market rate  involves no spread over the LIBoR rate (the discount rate).  With a positive spread, in
order to obtain S contractual  savings need to be multiplied  by a factor f> 1 which depends on the spread and the
schedule  profile.  The factor f is bigger the longer the maturity; in the extreme case of a console, contractual
financial  savings  would amount  to estimating  S with a discount  factor  equal to the market rate.13
combined,  the implied  break-even  downward  bias of  market prices is  32  cents on the dollar.
Alternatively,  if market  prices  on risky  debt  are assumed  to systema.ically  underestimate  the countries'
expected  future  debt  service  both  before  and after  the operation,  an average  downward  bias of 30 cents
per dollar would  be needed  to arrive at S=0.  Both sensitivity  exercises  show that very substantial
biases  are needed  to reverse  the qualitative  conclusion  that  the present  value  of direct  financial  savings
is likely  to be negative. As explained  before,  this result can be interpreted  as characterizing  average
direct  financial  savings  over the  long run.
Table  3: Sensitivity  Analysis  of S < 0
(cents  on the dollar
___  ___  ___  B.sP  k
Mexico  0.33  0.34  49X
Philippines  0.14  0.36  28%
Cost&Rica  0.27  0.14  66%
Venezuea  0.43  0.29  60%
Umtuay  0.05  0.58  8%
Total  0.32  I0X33  49%
Sow& :  Author' calculations.
It should be noted that both the scheduled  payment  and the full interest service  scenarios
(counterfactual  scenarios  (i) and (ii) in table 1 above)  would  lead to a present  discounted  value of
transfers  above  the face  value  of debt (because  market  interest  rates include  a risk premium  over the
risk-free  rate). Therefore  the implied  market  price, which  is the ratio between  this present  discounted
value and the face value  of debt, would  be above  one.  The deeply  discounted  market  value of debt
indicates  that  both scenarios  are inconsistent  with  the market. It is interesting  to notice  that  the implied
prices would  differ  across  countries  only if different  spreads  and schedule  profiles  apply;  since these
variations  are minor they would  result in only marginal  differences  across  countries. Therefore  the
discrepancy  between  these scenarios  and market  prices is larger the more creditworthy  the country.14
For completeness,  the implied debt prices under these two scenarios are computed in table 4 below
(assuming  a LIBOR  rate of 8 percent and a spread of 13/16).
The corresponding implied price for the historical counterf&ctual  (scenario (iii) in table  1
above) is also calculated  in table 4 under the same LIBOR rate assumption. It is interesting  to notice
that the continuation  of net transfers at their historical levels (as shown in table 1) for the entire future
is overoptimistic too.  In effect, the associated implicit price Is above the applicable market price.
Finally, for future reference, market-consistent  net transfer payments are presented. For this purpose,
as explained  above in connection  to table 2, the new portfolio of instruments  was decomposed  into the
up-front net compensation that banks received (the cost  C) and  the outstanding debt obligations
stripped off the collateralized  portions (risky debt).  For simplicity, it is assumed that net transfers on
account of risky debt obligations, both before and after the operation, amount to a constant stream of
payments,  whose present value equal the market value of risky debt.  Therefore their implied  prices are
equal to the relevant market prices.
Table 4: Market-Consistent Cashflow Savings
(US$ millions)
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In summary. theoretical considerations lead us to  believe that direct financial savings are
negative. both in present value and in the short. and possibly medium. run. The insienificance  of the
direct financial savines of the DDSR operation is not only a theoretical  presumption based on rational
expectations and a long horizon, but also a straightforward short-run implication of the way Brady
deals are structured.
To obtain positive direct financial  savings in present value terms would require the assumption
that banks grossly miscalculate repayment prospects and that  market prices  are  severely biased
downward.
Positive market discounts are not consistent  with the assumption  of full debt service, possibly
with reschedulings  at market rates such as in the assumption  of continuous  principal roll-over and full
interest payment.  Short-run financial savings would be  similarly biased if  unrealistic scenarios
inconsistent  with the recent historical  record are assumed. These biases are larger the larger the market
discount and the poorer the payment record of the debtor. Therefore the use of uniform scenarios
across debtor countries, like full contract  compliance,  would unduly favor operations conducted  by less
creditworffy contries,
M.  DIRECTIBENEMS
Changes in domestic absorption would follow the direct financial savings. In this section the
liquidity effect of direct financial  savings will be described and the possibly magnified  outcome due to
fiscal and foreign exchange constraints explained. This magnification  would justify the use of large
discount rates for discounting the cashflow savings.  Finally, we compute the internal rate of return
(IRR) of direct financial  savings under a variety of scenarios and show that under realistic scenarios  the
return is likely to be below the critical discount rate, which indicates that direct benefits of DDSR
operations  can be expected  to be negative.16
A debtor  country  in a one-good,  perfect  neoclassical  world  would  divide  one unit of additional
foreign exchange  between current consumption  and investment  according to  the  corresponding
marginal  propensities,  this implying  that investment  would be affected  by a  fraction of a unit.
Consequently,  the impact  of net transfers  on investment  is bound  to be relatively  small.  The deviations
from that model  which  appear  to be relevant  for the case at hand are the ones described  in foreign
exchange  two-gap models and the ones associated  with fiscal rigidities and the limitations  to
govermnent  policy,  because  the liquidity  effect  would  be in the form of foreign  exchange  and would
accru  -, to the government  (since most debt is public). The first set relates to  foreign exchange
constraints  and  the second  set to fiscal  constraints.
Two-gap  models  assume  that investment  goods and intermeeiRte  inputs are very difficult  to
substitute  domestically.  They  also assume  that  exports  are very inelastic;  otherwise,  as soon as foreign
exchange  becomes  more valuable  because  of its importance  for profitable  investment,  exports would
expand  and increase  the supply  of foreign  exchange.  In other words, domestic  substitution  would  be
achieved  through  international  trade. Under  those  conditions  it is possible  for the impact  of additional
foreign  resources  on investment  to be very high, even  higher  than  unity. It should  be noted  that  these
pessimistic  ideas  about  export  elasticities,  which  were at the izot of the import  substitution  policies  in
many  of the overindebted  countries  in past decades,  are now  being repudiated,  which  makes  the case
doubtful.  13
Since  commercial  debt being converted  is public  debt, it directly  affects  the liquidity  of the
public  sector. Given  the economic  and political  constraints  to cut public consumption  expenditures,
these  liquidity  effects  may  be very sizeable.  If complementary  public  investment  is cut, the impact  on
total investment  would  be magnified.  If revenue  is increased  in a distortionary  way, which  would  be
3An assessment  of the importance  of the magnifying  effect of the  foreign exchange  constraint certainly  cannot be
obtained  by measuring  the average incidence  of imported investment  goods in total investment: countries which
almost don't rely on  foreign goods would be assigned  an astronomical  multiplier linking additional foreign
exchange  and domestic  investment. While this constraint may be severe  in some countries, its relaxation would
not lead to the realiation of magnified  direct effects on investment  unless the savings constraint is also satisfied.
In order to assess the actual, as opposed to the potential, value of relaxing the foreign exchange  constaint  this
needs to be established.17
the  case if  inflationary  financing is  used or  least-resistance  changes te~ tax  codes are  made,
inefficiencies  would  arise. Similar  allocative  inefficiencies  may  arise  if domestic  debt  is expanded  to a
point  that crowds  out private  investment.
The best available  econometric  evidence  for credit-constrained  countries  on the subject  is in
Cohen (1990).  There it is shown that in the last decade, overall, one additional  unit of foreign
exchange  liquidity  can  be expected  to translate  into additional  domestic  consumption  and investment  in
proportion  two-thirds  and one-third  respectively,  which is broadly  consistent  with the neoclassical
model.  This evidence  leads us to be cautious  in estimating  large effects  of external  finance  on
investment,  and suggests  that both consumption  and investment  move  in the same  direction  in the face
of external  cashflow  shocks.
It should  be noted  that irrespective  of the relative  importance  of the implicit  multiplier  linking
external  cashflow  savings and investment,  to  the extent that cashflow  savings are negative the
investment  impact  would  also be negative. In the last section  we showed  that the direct financial
savings  are likely  to be negative,  both in the short-run  and in the long-run  (as measured  by present
value  calculations),  which  suggests  negative  investment  effects. Based  on the econometric  evidence,
which  shows  that  the investment  effect  is partial  and  that, therefore,  consumption  and investment  move
in the same  direction,  it appears  that both the corresponding  consumption  and investment  direct  effect
would  be negative. To the extent  that there is a negative  investment  impact,  there is also a negative
dynamic  component  further  contributing  to the negative  consumption  static  direct  effects.
The internal  rate  of retur  (IRR)  of the stream  of direct  financial  savings  provides  a summary
of the direct  benefits  of DDSR  operations,  that  is the welfare  implications  of these direct  effects. In a
credit-rationed  debtor country  the marginal  return on investment  (as well as the marginal  cost of
foregone  consumption)  is presumably  larger  than  the international  risk-free  rate, both for liquidity  and
risk reasons. Therefore,  such  a country  should  discount  future  streams  more  heavily  than  banks. This
would  be particularly  true in the case  of the stream  of direct  financial  savings  being analyzed  to the
extent  that their effect  on the allocative  efficiency  in the domestic  economy  is magnified  due to the18
relaxation  of constraints  on efficiency,  as suggested  above.  Therefore,  direct benefits would be
positive  if the IRR of the direct financial  savings  exceeds  the domestic  discount  rate, that is some
critical  level which  can be expected  to be above  the risk-free  international  rate.14 (This  statement  is
true under the assumption  that subsequent  cashflow  savings are positive; if subsequent  cashflow
savings  are negative,  then  direct  benefits  would  be positive  if the IRR  is below  the critical  level.)
In table 5, the IRR  is estimated  b-sed on three counterfactual  scenarios:  i) Interest  service;  ii)
Historic;  and iii) Market. The first two counterfactual  scenarios  are similar  to the ones  used in table 1
for the first four years after the operation  but extended  to the entire  future.  Regarding  restructured
debt, it is assumed  that Brady  exit bonds  are fully  serviced  and mature  in year 30 generating  a cash
inflow  equal  to the applicable  interest  collateral  (Brady  exit bonds  are 30-year  bullet  maturity  bonds
with collateralized  principal). Remaining  outstanding  debt not in the form of Brady exit bonds is
assumed  to receive  full interest service  with principal  roll-over  (as in counterfactual  (i)).  For the
market  scenarios,  by contrast,  the cashflow  savings  stream,  both before and after  the operation,  was
derived  based  on the uniform  market-consistent  net transfers  estimated  in table  4 above.
Table 5: Internal Rate of Return of Cashilow Savings
_in  Perc
Sor ce  Historic  MNu
Mexico  22.93  13.72  3.89
Philppines  NA  NA  287.00
Coda Rica  46.9  8.01  2.42
Veneuela  30.55  49.02  NA
Uguay  17.02  38.79  7.51
ToWl  25.25  19.91
Source:  Author's  calculations
141a World Bank  project lending, for example, the critical  level for IRR is about 10%.19
Under  the assumption  of full interest  payments,  the IRR  is very large in all countries 1s (in the
extreme  case  of the Philippines,  where  C is negative,  IRR  does not exist). On average,  all countries
except  the Philippines  combined,  it is around  25 percent  certainly  above  the critical  level. Under  the
assumption  of scheduled  debt  service,  the IRR  would  be even  larger because  the savings  stream  would
be more front-loaded.  As explained  above,  these  scenarios  are not consistent  with market  valuations
and lead  to overly  optimistic  estimations,  in this case  very large  IRRs. Under  the historic  assumption,
except  Costa  Rica  whose  IRR  is about  the assumed  risk-free  rate  of 8 percent,  direct  benefits  appear  to
be positive  as measured  by a sufficiently  large  IRR. However,  as noted  above, this scenario  is also
generally  inconsistent  with the market  and would,  therefore,  lead to optimistic  IRRs.  (Note  that in
these two scenarios  the subsequent  cashflow  savings are positive, and therefore  large iRRs imply
positive  direct  benefits.)
The market  scenario,  by contrast,  is, by definition,  consistent  with market  valuations. In the
case  of Mexico,  Costa  Rica, and Uruguay,  subsequent  savings  are positive  because  C  + S >0  (an up-
front payment  larger than banks' financial  gains  buys subsequent  savings). In this case, their IRRs
below the critical level (especially  in the case of Mexico  and Costa Rica) imply negative  direct
benefits. These  dismal  IRRs are the combined  result of negative  cashflow  savings  in present  value,
that is S <0, and the front-loading  of the operation  (arge C). In effect,  it can be easily  checked  that,
as a share  of the risk-free  discount  rate, the IRR  is equal  to 1  +S/C.  If S=0, the IRR  would  coincide
with the risk-free  rate (assumed  to be 8%). The lower  the overall  savings  S and the larger the front-
loading  C, the lower  IRR. Finally,  in the case  of the Philippines  and  Venezuela  subsequent  savings  are
negative  and signiflcantly  negative  direct  benefits  also result  (in the Philippines  the IRR is very large
and in Venezuela  it does  not exist).
5To  the  extent  tdat  debt  is reduced  at a discount,  the  IRR  is necessarily  larger  than  the risk-free  rate.20
In summary.  both in the short-run and in the long-run, direct effects on both consumption  and
investment  are likely to be negative as a result of negative  direct financial savings.  To the extent that
foreign exchange and fiscal constraints are significant, negative direct effects would be even more
signiflcant  due to the dynamic effect of lower investment.
Direct benefits as measured by comparing the IRR of direct cashflow savins  witlh  a critical
level appropriate  to credit-constrained  col=tries apgear to be negative too.  This is the  result of the
negative present value direct financial savings (S  <0)  and, in most cases, the front-loading of the
operation (C > 0).  To the extent that the.  country's particular circumstances  imply that direct financial
savings would relax important  foreign exchange or fiscal constraints inefficiently  depressing the level
of investment,  the critical level for IRRs would be larger and negative  direct benefits would be even
more significant.
IV.  INDIRECT BENEFITS
We know little about indirect effects. What follows is a tentative presentation of these effects
and their interaction. The sources of indirect effects can be  classified into domestic and external
sources.
a)  Domestic Sources
One set of indirect effects relates to incentive  effects on investment  and macroeconomic  policy
due to the reduction in the debt overhang, both in terms of debt stock reduction and ceilings on debt
service. The standard debt overhang hypothesis  states that the accumulated  debt acts as a tax on future
output, discouraging investment,  since an improvement  in the economic performance  of the indebted
country benefits the creditors in the form of higher  debt repayments.
The theoretical  case of debt overhang effects  has been made so emphatically  that the possibility
of a declining debt value function (a debt Laffer curve) was taken seriously by many scholars. Being
on the declining portion of the Laffer curve would allow to avoid an unpleasant world of trade-offs;21
both parties  would benefit  from debt  forgiveness. The only party to benefit  for sure in the debtor
country: 'lo the extent  that private  creditors  have  not found  it in their interest  to condone  debt  claims
without  quid pro quo the Laffer  curve  remains  an Intellectual  curiousity. But a Laffer curve is not
needed  to rationalize  DDSk. Relatively  weak  disincentive  effects  would  lead  to inefficiences  that may
be alleviated  by DDSR.
Leaving  aside  the uncertainty  over  future  payments  that  a debt  overhang  may  induce,  which  is
conceptually  separate  from the original  argument,  as a practical  matter, the average  implicit  debt
overhang  tax appears  to be small  if measured  as the fraction  of GDP which  is paid in the form of net
transfers  to commercial  banks  (certainly  less  than  5%).  More  specifically,  what  would  be relevant  for
gauging  the likely  incentive  effect  of debt  reduction  is the ch  in the rate.  This change  depends  on
the probability  of the portion of debt reduced  being ever repaid; in the extreme  case where that
probability  is zero, expected  net transfers,  and therefore  the maAet  value  of debt and the implicit  tax
rate, would  be unaffected.  What matters  for the change  in debt  burden  and, to a first approximation,
the change  in the implicit  average  tax rate, is not the face  value  of debt  reduction  per se but its market
value,  which  captures  the effect  on future  net transfers. It is apparent  that so far debt reduction  has
been  limited,  as shown  in table 6, particularly  when,  as previously  suggested,  it is measured  in terms
of value reduction  (shown  in the last column  of table 6).  Therefore,  unless  debt reduction  is very
comprehensive,  the change  in this implicit  average  rate can be expected  to be negligible  if debt is
deeply  discounted. 16 Conceivably,  the change  in the marginal  rate, which  is the relevant  one for an
incentive  viewpoint,  may  be more  significant.  Even  then, it should  be noticed  that private  investment
would  react to a relaxation  of the debt overhang  only to the extent  that private agents are able to
foresee  a corresponding  lower  future  capital  taxation  as a result  of debt reduction,  which  may not be
realistic  unless  there is an explicit  policy  statement  and commitment  to that effect. Furthermore,  the
incentive  effect  of debt  overhang  is only part of the story.  Its income  effect  could  conceivably  offset
16Nevertheless, tho establishment  of a relatively low scheduled  debt service profile in 3C-year  bulet-matuity
Brady  bonds, for a given total amunt  of debt, provides a positive incentive compared to the situation where
amortzaon due would immediately  capture  any upside  shock favorng the country.22
it and lead to efficient levels of lnvewtment  (as it is sometimus argued in the case of  savings  inelastic to
interest rates).
Table  6: Debt Reduction
(US$ millions)
Total xE  De"t  Comni.eae5al  Bank  Debt
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Poftet  Madet  Va
of ENeb  D  sb/
Debt RedmeU_
as p.ceof  Debt
Prepsn  PtsDpwa  Redmm
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A/  _
Mexico  9S.416  17  47,170  43  19
Philiooins  28,468  2  6.600  10  -30
Coda Rica  4.603  22  1.608  73  30
Venezue  32.491  13  19.011  26  -51
__  Uuay  3.707  18  1.610  S0  38
:  Total  164.685  14  75.999  37
Seties  in million of dolua,  unles otherwie indica.
a/ Basd on the  reduction  in the  pront  value  of flaky  commecil  bank  debt  obtigation.
b/ Based  on naket  value of riky bank  debt.
Soum:  Clasna,  Diwan  and Fernand-Aris  (1992)  and  author' calculadons.
Nevertheless,  debt overhang  effects may be more sizable than what the previous  analysis may
suggest.  First,  while the direct  effect on private  investment may be in fact insignificant  to the extent
that  the change in expected capital taxation  and other  return-relevant  variables  may be  small  for  the
reasons  discussed,  the effect on  public policy  may be substantial.  In this  context,  investment  is any
activity  imposing up-front  costs  which improves future output and debt  collections,  such as structural
adjustment.  On  the one  hand,  due  to  the debt  overhang  effect,  soun4  growth-oriented  policies  are
made more  attractive by virtue  of debt  reduction.  The public sector,  compared to the private  sector,
may be in a better position to internalize the debt overhang disincentive effect  and may therefore  react
more  strongly  to  debt  reduction.  On  the  other  hand,  sound  public  policy  is  facilitated  by  an
environment  more  conducive  to  political  consensus.  If  fiscal  constraints  impose  substantial23
inefficiencies  on the policy framework, these beneficial  effects may entail significant improvements  in
the policy framework,  domestic investment,  and welfare.1 7 It is important  to note, however, that the
available empirical evidence of the disincentive effect of external debt on domestic investment in
indebted countries is  so  far  limited, and the  studies that have been done  can be  described as
inconclusive.
Second, another set of indirect effects  from domestic sources relate to the beneficial effects of
the reduction of uncertainty  on investment  and on macroeconomic  policy sustainability and credibility
that the reduction in the debt overhang may produce.  Since debt reduced amounts to an unallocated
potential claim on the country, it can be  argued that in connection with uncertainty reduction the
relevant measure of debt reduction is nominal reduction rather than its market value.  As shown in
table 6,  nominal debt reduction is much more significant than its market value and may lead to a
significant  reduction in uncertainty.  Furthermore, the conversion  of syndicated debt into bonds may
further reduce uncertainty  to the extent that they are more difficult to renegotiate and therefore actual
payments  are more predictable. Since investment  is for the most part irreversible  at the country level,
uncertainty may lead to a wait-and-see  attitude, particularly if uncertainty is expected to be resolved
soon. Waiting may be more valuable than investing.  An uncertain environment is not conducive to
efficient public policy either, because future policy itself becomes uncertain. This in turn would have
real consequences  on the economy  immediatel:.
Additionally, the feasibility of government policy may be  called into question and adverse
expectations  may develop destabilizing  the system, such as expectations  of devaluation. We know little
about how the expectation  dynamics might magnify the original impulse  and become self-filfilling, but
casual evidence  suggests  that this magnification  may be significant.  To the extent that the expectations
are not fulfilled, the government  incurs losses, since the adverse expectations are incorporated in the
premium of public domestic debt. This additional  financing  requirement  makes  the fiscal situation more
17An example  of this fiscal mechanism  in the context of debt negotiations  is given in Fernandez-Arias  (1991),
wheo  the implicit tax rate on output which obtains through bargaining is sensitive to  fiscal constraints and
translate into a strong  tax on sound public policy  and inefficient  policy frameworks.24
unstable  and  tends  to absorb  increasing  volumes  of domestic  savings  and crowd  out private  investment
through  increases  in the expected  real interest rates in the economy  at large. 18 Another  similarly
destabilizing  factor may  be the perception  that the government  may  be more likely to default  on its
domestic  debt. 19 To the extent that fiscal adjustment  is  inefficient,  as  suggested above, the
implications  for the policy  framework  and  the domeszic  economy  may  in turn be substantial.
However,  the reduction  in uncertainty  produced  by the restructuring  is certainly  not complete.
In effect,  market  discounts  indicate  that sizeable  country  risks persist. Even if it is true that bonds
cannot  be rescheduled,  uncertainty  would  persist and may be sizeable  because  of the all-or-nothing
nature  of the payments  under  this assumption.20  Nevertheless,  it is fair to say that uncertainty  is
likely  to be reduced  at least  in the medium  term  when  debt  service  appears  feasible,  which  may  have  a
dramatic  effect  on tMe  sustainability  of macroeconomic  policy, credibility,  and, as explained  before,
interest  rates  and  the investment  climate. Its significance  in the long run is more  doubtful,  but it might
be also  less important  if the economy  takes  off.
A related argument  states that by conducting  the DDSR operation the debtor signals its
seriousness  and commitment.  This in turn would  affect  the general  perception  of the Government  and
lead  to increased  confidence  on the part of domestic  and foreign  investors,  which  in turn would  boost
investment.  Arguments  based  on perceptions  should  be taken  with  caution,  however.  Cheap  signals  are
not credible.  For a signal  to convey  information  and  therefore  be credible  it has to be the case  that the
wrong type, that is a 'bad" government,  would  incur additional  production  costs in producing  the
signal  beyond  the point  where  it has an incentive  to produce  it (i.e. that  a "bad' government  would  not
see a benefit  in pretending  that it is in the right  track and subscribing  to a DDSR  operation). In any
See  van Wijnbergen  (1991).
19See  Dooley et. al. (1990) for a model  along these  lines.
20Similarly, conversion to fixed nominal interest rate is not necessarily  significantly more certain in real terms
than floating interest rates, since it depends on how well LIBOR and intrnational  prices correlate. Downside
contingency  provisions  parallel to the recapture  clauses  stipulated  in most of the agreements  would be another way
of reducing  uncertainty  which has not materialized  so far.25
event,  this case  needs  to be made  rather  than  taken  for granted.
Finally, the role of international  financial  institutions  (IFIs) may be also important  for the
policy  framework. Inurelation  to the establishment  of confidence,  to the extent that IFIs have an
information  advantage  regarding  the country vis a yis commercial  b3vnks  and their judgement  is
credible,  their seal of approval  of the operation  may  also  provide  a credible  signal. A more  tangible
channel  through  which IFIs may improve  the resulting  policy framework  is by imposing  policy
conditionality.  To the extent  that the country  benefits  from the operation  and that IFI support  is
important  for its successful  conclusion,  leverage  for conditionality  would  be improved  and the policy
framework  consequently  enhanced.
Some  of the indirect  effects  linked  to domestic  sources  can be gauged  by looking  at domestic
interest rates and stock prices in past DDSR  operations,  which would immediately  react to new
information  regarding  the future. For these indicators  the most revealing  time period is around  the
date of the agreement  in principle,  where  most of the new information  regarding  the operation  was
incorporated. The interpretation  of their evolution  after the agreement  is concluded  is less clear,
particularly  because  the five countries  experienced  significant  shocks  in terms  of trade and, in the case
of the Philippines,  natural disasters.  Chart 1 depicts  the evolution  of nominal  interest rates and
inflation,  and chart 2 depicts  the evolution  of real domestic  stock  prices (the time profile  has been
divided  into four  phases  defined  by the following  three  events:  i) the date  of the Brady  announcement
(March  10, 1989);  ii) the date an agreement  in principle  on a DDSR  operation  was achieved  in each
country;  and  iii) the closing  date  of the agreement).26
Chart 1: Domestic  Interest  Rate  and Inflation  Rates
Mexico  Philippines
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Chart 2: Real Stock Prices
I~~~~~~~~h  ,~  A
Rel Stock  Prie Inex.
Vtal  lines  coueoad  to dw date of tbe following  eved  defining  foi  phae:
8ady  Announcement  DDSR  agement  In  priocaple  , and  DDSR agreement.
Source:  IFC.
Nominal interest rates fell abruptly by 20 percentage  points in Mexico during the negotiation
period, and ex-post real interest rates fell by almost 60 percentage points in a six-month period as
negotiations  evolved.  To a large extent this improvement  has been maintained over time.  Because
interest service on domestic debt was a very sizable proportion of Mexican public revenues and put
severe pressure on public policy (about one-third in 1989), this development  entailed a very significant
relief to the Mexican  public sector several times the liquidity relief on external debt (the real burden of
domestic debt fell by more than 15 percent of public revenue between 1988 and 1990).  TMe  interest
rate response and its implications were much less dramatic, if at all measurable, in the rest of the
countries.28
Stock  market  prices  are available  only  for Mexico,  Venezuela  and the Philippines.  In the three
countries  real stock  prices rose during  the negotiation  period, which  would  suggest  that the market
expected  positive  effects  from  DDSR. After  the operations  were concluded,  they  stagnated  in Mexico,
continued  to climb  in Venezuela,  which  sugests that  positive  non-DDSR  factors  might  have  been  also
at play,  and dropped  sharply,  reversing  previous  gains,  in the Philippines.
b)  External Sources
To the extent  that the DDSR  operation  improves  country  creditworthiness  by improving  the
country's  prospects  and reducing  the debt  overhang,  additional  foreign  savings  can be expected  to flow
in. In the case of participating  commercial  banks, unless  debt reduction  is close to complete,  the
improvement  in country  risk is not likely  to change  the rationing  of credit  in the medium  term, but it
would at least make the future resumption  of voluntary  lending  more likely. In the case of other
foreign  investors,  it may  reinforce  current  capital  flows  and may  open  the door for voluntary  financing
from  sources  not closely  related  to commercial  banks  (such  as FDI, portfolio,  etc.).  Confirming  this
optimistic  outlook,  in both Mexico  and Venezuela  private  and  public  sector entities  have been  able to
access  voluntarily  private  capital  markets  in significant  amounts  as documented  below.
Nevertheless,  to the extent  that the reduction  in debt is limited, both in face value and in
market  value,  only limited  additional  inflows  can be expected  on this account. Automatic  renewed
foreign  capital  inflows  should  not be taken  for granted. Improvements  in the policy  framework  and a
better investment  climate,  as described  above,  are likely  the most  significant  factors  attracting  foreign
capital.  Furthermore, the  positive effect on  creditworthiness  is  not  without its  drawbacks.
Unfortunately  we do not have a good theory or evidence  about how the values  of foreign  claims
interact  and relate  to each  other, but at least  in the case  of non-participating  foreign  claimants  subject
to similar  risks  (e.g. non-participating  commercial  banks,  private  bondholders)  the operation  may  very
well  result  in large-scale  free riding  and increased  extraction  of resources.29
The evolution of country creditworthiness  indicators and foreign resource inflows are depicted
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The credit ratings by private market participants2l  for all five countries rose in parallel, which
confirms the beneficial effects of DDSR on country creditwortiiness.  Since these ratings are in the
form of numerical rankings over a large sample of countries, they are a relative measure that can be
interpreted as reflecting specific circumstances  in the countries involved (as opposed to international
factors such as the fall in LIBOR  rates).
21The  credit nkings used in the analysis  were taken  from the bgstitutional  Investor.30
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The evolution of  external capital inflows is  also generally consistent with improved
creditworthiness,  with the exception  of the Philippines. Since  it takes  time to attract  capital  inflows,
this piece  of evidence  is necessarily  tainted  by other  shocks  experienced  by the country. One  useful
measure  of the ability  of a country  to attract  foreign  financing  is the adjusted  resource  transfer  from
abroad, defined  as net capital  inflows  and transfers  (including  errors and omissions)  net of factor
payments;  or measured  from the use viewpoint,  the deficit  on trade in goods and non-factor  services
(the negative  of the resource  balance)  plus reserve  accumulation.  The 1991 transfer  is significantly
larger than  the 1990  transfer  in Mexico  (by 4 percent  of GDP), Venezuela  (by 11 percent  of GDP),
and Costa  Rica  (by 3 percent  of GDP). Information  available  for similar  countries 22 show  a similarly
increasing  trend of 3 percent  of GDP, which  weakens  the significance  of these  positive  developments
in countries  with  DDSR  operations.
Another  source  of indirect  benefits  relates  to the efficiency  of the new arrangements  between
22Unweighted  avenge of the rest of the SIMICs  (WDT 1991-1992)  except  Bolivia,  Nicaragua,  and Syria for
which 1991  estimaes were not available.31
the debtor country  and foreign  investors. In particular,  better coordination  and incentives  of the
selected  group  of non-exiting  commercial  banks,  who  chose  to provide  new money  or at least not to
exit completely  by not taking  buyback  and debt-equity  swaps  options, is an additional  reason for
optimism.  It is not clear,  however,  that  most of the debt  negotiation  problems  in the past were caused
by a set  of commercial  banks  too prone  to exit or by the commercial  banks  inability  to coordinate.  The
new  environment,  particularly  in the face  of downside  contingencies,  remains  to be seen. The market
valuations  of converted  debt indicate  that the remaining  commercial  banks are not close to providing
voluntary  lending  without  special  guarantees,  and therefore  do not necessarily  support  the hope that
they  are going  to be flexible  if payment  difficulties  arise.
Finally, official  creditors  may find it more attractive  to invest  not only because  of improved
country  creditworthiness  but also because  the impact  of development  financing  would  be enhanced.
One  obvious  reason  why  this may  be so is that the policy  framework  is better. Another  reason  is that
relatively  tow scheduled  profiles  on commercial  debt service  limit the potential  leakage  of official
money  to commercial  banks,  therefore  improving  its development  impact. Official  financial  support
for DDSR  operations  itself  may  be one example  of this phenomenon,  provided  that support  would  not
have  been  forthcoming  in the absence  of the operation  because  it would  not have advanced  economic
development.  In this case, from the point  of view of the beneficiary  countries,  the official  financial
support  in terms of additional  lending  and acceleration  of set-asides  would amount  to an indirect
benefit  of the operation. Notice  that official  support  financing  amounts  to an indirect  benefit  to the
country  only  to the extent  that  it would  have  not been  provided  in the absence  of the operation. From
the point  of view of these  official  creditors,  who  make  the policy  decisions  on this financing,  this is
equivalent  to saying  that  unless  the DDSR  operation  is conducted  no extra official  financing  would  be
worthwhile.
In summary.  indirect  effects  depend  primarily  on the realization  of a bette policy  framework
and investment  climate  as a consequence  of the operation,  which  would  improve  incentives  to invest
domestically  and  attract  foreign  savings  in the form of additional  sources  of international  ital. While32
it is too early to pas  definitive  judgement  on the significance  of improved  investment  incentives  as
traditionally  described  by the debt  overhang  hypothesis,  it appears  that this case  bas been  exaggerated
in the past. The increased  quality  and credibility  of macroeconomic  policy  due to stability  and the
reduction  in uncertainty  may  have,  in contrast,  a large impact.  Tbeory  needs  to be developed  in order
to assess the potentially  significant  effect of DDSR operations  on  additional  international  capital
sources,  both as a consequence  of the more cooperative  relationship  between  creditors  and debtor
countries  as  well as the reduction in  foreign investment  risk associated  with the  reduction  in
commercial  debt overhang.  It  appears  that the crucial factor underlying  the realization  of these
transformations  is a good  and  credible  policy  framework.  which  may  be facilitated  by the alignment  of
incentives  and  the reduction  in uncertainy.
V.  EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
It appears safe to conclude  that, contrary to widely held views, commercial  banks have
probably  benefitted  from the operations,  as explained  in section  II and suggested  by our negative
estimates  of S. In other  words,  due to the voluntary  nature  of commercial  bank  participation  in DDSR
operations,  direct  financial  savings  to the country  are probably  negative  in present  value  terms.  The
benefit  from DDSR  is not that  debt is bought  at 'bargain prices' at the expense  of commercial  banks.
It appears  difficult  to justify  a DDSR  operation  on purely  financial  grounds. A more realistic  way  of
looking  at a DDSR  operation  is to view it as a "project"  which  involves  a certain  financial  cost. The
return of such  project  is the beneficial  macroeconomic  impact  of the DDSR  operation,  which  we will
call  the development  impact.
The main purpose of DDSR is the establishment  of a more efficient arrangement
between debtor countries and commercial  banks, leading to  improved  conditions for economic
development.  A DDSR  operation  with no development  impact  would  be a costiy project with no
return and should  not be undertaken. The achievement  of a beneficial  development  impact  through
DDSR, however, would lead to positive returns.  These returns are the efficiency gains of DDSR,33
which both parties can share to their mutual advantage:  the debtor country may significantly  benefit
even as commercial banks improve their financial position through participating in the operation.
DDSR operations would entail net benefits to countries only to the extent that the efficiency gains
produced by  DDSR operations more than  compensate the  financial cost  that  commercial bank
participation imposes.  Whereas DDSR operations are  likely to  entail financial costs to  debtor
countries, which should not be iajnored  in the analysis  of DDSR operations, these costs m&d  ve offset
by the development  benefit of DDSR.
The development impact of DDSR is usually measured by the increase in the GDP growth
rate.23  It appears too early to  give a  full account of the growth effects in  countries which have
undertaken  DDSR operations because  of the short time elapsed  since the operadons were concluded. A
suitable alternative is to  look at the change in investment  patterns.  Even then, gestation lags, the
impact of other exogenous shocks 24,  and the complex nature of the linkages between DDSR and
macroeconomic  performance,  make it very difficult to assess the evidence. The historical record could
provide a benchmark for measuring DDSR effects, but may fail to take into account other factors
besides DDSR.  Alternatively, a comparison with severely indebted economies similar to  those
reviewed here provides another benchmark against which to measure the success of DDSR operations
which would incorporate common international  factors.  However, recent positive trends in many
severely indebted countries, particularly in foreign investment  and secondary  market prices, are pardy
due to the expectation  of the impact  of future DDSR operations in those countries, severely limiting the
usefulness  of this benchmark.
Subject to the above caveats, in chart 5 we present the evolution of the investment-GDP  ratio,
23From a wefare  point of view this is a partial measure  because  it disregards  the cost of the consumption
foregone  as a result of increased  investment. Nevertheless,  under the premis  that
the  welfar optimal  investment  level is higher than the  ones observed,  changes in GDP growth are directly  related
to chages in welfare.
MAUl  five economies  reviewed here  have expenenced  significant  shocks in terms  of trade and, in the case of the
Philippines,  atunra  disasters. The Gulf war was the  major  exogenous  shock.  Its effect was positive in the oil-
exporting  countries, Mexico  and, especially,  Venezuela;  it was negative in the  oil-importing  countries.34
as measured by the gross fixed capital formation, for the five Brady countries reviewed and for the
average of the rest the Severely Indebted Middle Income Countries (as defined in World Debt Tables
1991-1992)  25  Investment,  however, may provide a misleading  picture of success if domestic savings
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25Unweighted  avoto  over the rest of the SlMICs except  Bolivia and Syria for which .1991  infonmatioll  was not
available.35
Preliminary  1991  data  indicate  that  the change  in the ratio  of total  gross  fixed  capital  formation
to GDP between 1990  and 1991 increased  in Mexico  (1.4 percentage  points) and Venezuela  (2.7
percentage  points),  remained  essentially  constant  in Uruguay,  and decreased  in the Philippines  (4.3
percentage  points)  and Costa  Rica  (1.1 percentage  polints).  Compared  to 1988  and 1989  levels, 1991
levels are higher only in the cases  of Mexico  and Costa Rica.  These qualitative  time trends are
essentially  determined  by the evolution  of the private portion of gross fixed capital formation.
Nevertheless,  these  trends do not compare  well with the average  trend in other SIMICs26,  which  is
positive  and actually  better except  for Venezuela  (the 1991  ratio increased  by 2.0 percentage  points
from 1990).
In relation  to domestic  savings,  preliminary  1991  data indicate  that  the change  in the domestic
savings  to GDP ratio between 1990 and 1991 increased  only in Mexico  (3.1 percentage  points)
reurning to the levels  in 1988  and 1989. In Costa  Rica  it stayed  essentially  constant,  in Uruguay  and
Venezuela  it decreased  returning  to levels in recent  years, and in Philippines  it plummeted  by 30
percent  (5.5  percentage  points). This fall in savings  is also observed  in the rest of the SIMICs,  which
on average  had a significant  drop of 3.3 percentage  points in their savings ratio continuing  the
declining  trends  in past  years. Perhaps  with the partial  exception  of Mexico,  the savings  performance
is not encouraging.
The fragmentary  evidence  shown  in charts 1-6 points  to a parallel  between  the success  of the
operations  in terms  of their macroeconomic  impact  and  good  policies.  In the case  of Mexico,  and to a
somewhat  lesser degree Venezuela,  improved  and strong adjustment  policies, sustained  over the
period, have generated  the largest  development  benefits  from debt reduction. The gains have been
smaller in  the other countries  where the policy framework  has not been as supportive.  This
observation  reinforces  the presumption  that a  strong policy framework  is required to  achieve a
significant  development  impact  from DDSR.  This implies that, from the viewpoint of official
26Unweighted  aveage over the rest of the SIMICs (WDT  1991-1992)  except Bolivia and Syria for which 1991
information  wa not available  (information  for Brazil  based on constant  price projections).36
supporting  creditors,  the track record of economic  adjustment  reform is a key indicator  of future
DDSR  develorment  benefits. Whether  these  development  benefits  have  been  larger than the ftnancial
cost entailed  by past operations  is too early  to tell with certainty;  the evidence  suggests  that Mexico
has benefitted  from the DDSR  operation  and that the other countries  may have also benefitted  to a
lesser  extent. 27
One  thing appears  clear,  however:  significant  indirect  beneflts  are needed  for the country  to
benefit  from DDSR.  This is so because  direct benefits,  as shown in section III, are likely to be
negative  as a consequence  of commercial  bank  financial  gains  and because  uf the front-loaded  nature  of
DDSR  operations.  Therefore  significant  indirect  benefits  are crucial  for obtaining  positive  net benefits
to the country,  which  are equal  to the algebraic  sum  of direct  and indirect  benefits. This is in contrast
to widely  held views, based  on unrealistic  counterfactual,  that  justify DDSR  operations  in terms of
cashflow  savings  and the resulting  direct  benefits. Counterfactual  scenarios  consistent  with  the recent
historical  record and market  valuations  imply little liquidity  relief in the medium  term, if any, and
dismal ERRa.
The required indirect benefits  may result from improvements  in the creation and use of
domestic  savings  as well as from the attraction  of foreign  savings. While  the traditional  arguments
related  to debt  overhang  tax-like  disincentives  to private  investment  are probably  exaggerated,  there  are
a host of other channels  through  which  indirect  benefits  may come about.  At the center of their
realization  appears  the quality  of the policy  framework,  which  may  be facilitated  and made  credible  by
the DDSR  operation.
Finally, from the IFI and other official  supporting  creditor  policy viewpoint, in order to
determine  whether  DDSR support is the right policy, the benefit to the country resulting  from
supporting  a DDSR  operation  needs  to be compared  with the benefit  to the country  resulting  from a
27M& is consist  with the results that would be obtained from  applying the evaluation orocedue  outlined in
Bulow  and Rogoff (1991). In effect,  in our estimation,  this evaluation  procedure  would show that all of the five
countries may have benefitted from the operations  and that, on average, the five countries combined may have
benefitted  almost  as much as baks.37
similar support not linked to DDSR.  Once it is recognized that DDSR direct benefits are likely
negative, and that, therefore, DDSR operations entail a direct cost, that comparison is not an obvious
one.  If DDSR indirect benefits only consisted of the liquidity-related  benefits of supporting official
lending  that a credit constrained  country would be also expected  to enjoy in the absence  of DDSR, then
DDSR support would not be sound policy because it would entail unnecessary  direct costs for the same
development  impact. For DDSR support to make sense, DDSR needs to have value in itself: it needs
to engender  additional  indirect  benefits significant  enough as to compensate  its direct costs.References
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